Texas Civil Procedure by Figari, Ernest E., Jr.
SMU Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 11
1974
Texas Civil Procedure
Ernest E. Figari Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Ernest E. Figari, Jr.*
M AJOR developments in the field of civil procedure during the survey pe-
riod include judicial decisions, statutory enactments,' and amendments to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 This Survey will examine these develop-
ments and consider their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The propriety of out-of-state service under article 203 lb,3 the Texas long-
arm statute, continues to be the subject of considerable appellate attention.
Section 6 of article 2031b states that service may be effected under the stat-
ute by serving process upon the secretary of state, who shall be conclusively
presumed to be authorized to receive service, "provided that the Secretary
of State shall forward a copy of such service to the person" being sued. 4
This proviso has created uncertainty for plaintiffs who seek to establish a
record that a defaulting nonresident was served under article 2031b in the
required manner. Is the record perfected through the filing of a citation
and return showing service on the secretary of state? Or, must the record
show compliance with the additional statutory requirement that the secretary
of state forward a copy of the process to the nonresident defendant? In
a decision of major importance, the Texas Supreme Court in Whitney
v. L & L Realty Corp.5 concluded that service under article 2031b is not
completed until process is forwarded to the defendant. Thus, "a showing
in the record that the Secretary of State forwarded a copy of the process
is essential to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the defendants' per-
sons."" The required showing may, of course, take the form of a certificate
of mailing which is available from the secretary of state for a small fee. 7
The opinion in Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner,s a recent de-
cision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, is a vir-
tual guidebook to the problems facing a plaintiff seeking to invoke article
2031b. Contrary to several state court decisions, 9 the Fifth Circuit con-
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern
Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. The enactments which have procedural implications principally concern venue.
See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subds. 5, 31 (Supp. 1973). These enact-
ments became effective Aug. 27, 1973.
2. As a result of the amendments, 3 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were modi-
fied. These changes became effective Sept. 1, 1973. See Civil Procedure Rules
Amended, 36 TEx. B.J. 495 (1973).
3. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
4. Id. § 6.
5. 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973). See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 182, 183 (1973).
6. 500 S.W.2d at 96.
7. See Professional Headnotes, 36 TEx. B.J. 1117-18 (1973).
8. 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973).
9. E.g., Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), er-
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eluded that the "[p]laintiff has the burden of proving that defendant is
amenable to process under the forum state's jurisdiction statute."'10 A plain-
tiff is not, however, required to prove a defendant's amenability to process
under the forum's jurisdictional statute by a preponderance of the evidence.
Rather, a plaintiff meets his burden by making merely a prima facie show-
ing of the minimum contacts necessary to support jurisdiction.11
Gardiner is also informative in its interpretation of article 2031b. Section
3 of that article authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
when he is "doing business" in Texas. 12  "Doing business," as defined by
section 4, includes "the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this
State."'13 Focusing on section 4, the Fifth Circuit found that "[i]t is imma-
terial that the tortious act occurred outside -the state, for it is well established
that the statute extends to injury occurring within the state as a result of
a wrongful act committed outside the state."' 14
Declaring what had been more hesitatingly suggested in earlier cases,'
the Fifth Circuit proclaimed that the "stream of commerce" theory is appli-
cable to the determination of whether a defendant is amenable to service
under article 2031b.' 6 To the delight of those plaintiffs who resort to article
2031b, the court held that "[w]hen a nonresident defendant introduces a
product into interstate commerce under circumstances that make it reason-
able to expect that the product may enter the forum state, the forum may
assert jurisdiction over the defendant in a suit arising out of injury caused
by the product in the forum .... ,,17
Straining the long-arm of article 2031b, a federal district court had con-
cluded during a previous survey period that the Texas activities of a sub-
sidiary corporation should be imputed to its parent for jurisdictional pur-
poses, thereby allowing the court to sustain nonresident service on the par-
ent.'8  A welcomed retraction of this extension of the long-arm statute oc-
curred in Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.' 9 The plaintiff brought
suit in federal district court against two corporate defendants, one a subsid-
iary of the other, seeking a declaratory judgment of the invalidity of a patent
owned by the parent company. The subsidiary was served with process
through its registered agent, but service on the parent corporation, which
was neither incorporated nor licensed to do business in Texas, was attempted
ror ref. n.r.e.; Taylor v. American Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1972); Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1968).
10. 473 F.2d at 1232; accord, Tetco Metal Prods., Inc. v. Langham, 387 F.2d 721
(5th Cir. 1968).
11. 473 F.2d at 1232; accord, O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th
Cir. 1971).
12. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (1964).
13. Id. § 4.
14. 473 F.2d at 1232 n.5.
15. See, e.g., Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970);
Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
16. 473 F.2d at 1234. See generally Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth,
417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969) (2-1 decision).
17. 473 F.2d at 1234.
18. Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
see Figari, supra note 5, at 183.
19. 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
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under article 2031b. The parent corporation filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff responded with the contention
that the subsidiary was "an alter ego" of the parent.2 0  While the parent
corporation owned all of the common stock of the subsidiary, maintained
interlocking directorates and officers with the subsidiary, and exercised con-
trol over the business decisions of the subsidiary, corporate separateness was
strictly maintained. Observing that the facts presented did not establish "a
prima facie showing of actual control of the internal affairs of the subsid-
iary by the parent," the federal district court properly concluded that the
Texas activities of the subsidiary could not be imputed to the parent for
jurisdictional purposes. 2 1
II. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Rule 120a,22 which establishes the conditions of special appearances to
challenge personal jurisdiction, requires that such an appearance "shall be
made by sworn motion" filed prior to any other pleading or motion. Inter-
preting the rule strictly, the court in Stewart v. Walton Enterprises, Inc.
28
concluded that the filing of an unsworn contest to personal jurisdiction con-
stituted a general appearance and subjected the movant to the jurisdiction
of the court for all purposes.
III. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
Where service on a resident in person is not practical, rule 10624 author-
izes the trial court to order substituted service to be made by leaving a copy
of the citation, with petition attached, at the usual place of business of the
defendant to be served, or by delivering it to any one over sixteen years
of age at the defendant's usual place of abode. Invalidating a substituted
service ordered on the basis of an unsworn motion, the court of civil appeals
in Kirkegaard v. First City National Bank concluded that a showing of the
impracticality of personal service is essential to an authorization of substi-
tuted service under rule 106.25
IV. VENUE
The most significant development in venue practice came in the form
of two additions to article 1995.20 The first, aimed at the elimina-
tion of distant forum abuses in consumer transactions, 27 was an amend-
20. Id. at 245.
21. Id. at 249-50.
22. TEx. R. Crv. P. 120a.
23. 496 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; accord,
Austin Rankin Corp. v. Cadillac Pool Corp., 421 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1967).
24. TEx. R. Civ. P. 106.
25. 486 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972). Even if an evidentiary
showing had been made, however, the court noted that the service itself was defective
because of the failure of the sheriff's return to reveal full compliance with rule 106.
Id. at 895.
26. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subds. 5, 31 (Supp. 1973).
27. See Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed
Solution, 51 TaxAs L. REv. 269 (1973).
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ment to subdivision 5 which requires creditors to sue consumers in a
forum bearing a genuine relationship to either the execution of their
contract or the defendant's domicile. Now consisting of two subsections,
subdivision 5 retains its former provisions in the first subsection.28  The ad-
dition of a second subsection acts to eliminate the distant forum abuses by
providing that in an action upon a contract arising out of a "consumer trans-
action," suit by a "creditor" upon the contract may be brought against the
defendant either "in the county in which the defendant in fact signed the
contract" or "in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of
the commencement of the action."'29
Subdivision 31, which is completely new, governs the venue of a suit for
breach of warranty. It permits "suits for breach of warranty by a manufac-
turer of consumer goods" to be brought either "in any county where the
cause of action or a -part thereof accrued, or in any county where such
manufacturer may have an agency or representative, or in the county in
which the principal office of such company may be situated, or in the county
where the plaintiff or plaintiffs reside." 30
Several judicial decisions during the survey period also have had an im-
pact on Texas venue practice. In Wilson's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Behrens Drug
Co.31 the supreme court considered whether all venue facts relied upon by
a plaintiff must be alleged in both his petition and controverting plea. The
plaintiff brought suit in McLennan County on a sworn account for merchan-
dise sold to the defendant drugstores. The defendants filed pleas of privi-
lege asserting their right to be sued in Harris County, but the plaintiff re-
sponded with a controverting plea alleging that the sales were made pursuant
to a written contract in which the defendants had agreed to make payment
in McLennan County. Although mention of the written contract was made
for the first time in the controverting plea, the trial court overruled the pleas
of privilege on the basis of former subdivision 5,32 which allowed a suit to
be maintained in the county where a defendant has contracted in writing
to perform an obligation. Settling a conflict in decisions of the courts of
28. The first subsection, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 5(a) (Supp.
1973), provides:
(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b), if a person has con-
tracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, ex-
pressly naming such county, or a definite place therein, by such writing,
suit upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought against him,
either in such county or where the defendant has his domicile.
29. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 5(b) (Supp. 1973), provides:
(b) In an action founded upon a contractual obligation of the de-
fendant to pay money arising out of or based upon a consumer trans-
action for goods, services, loans, or extensions of credit intended primar-
ily for personal, family, household or agricultural use, suit by a creditor
upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought against the defend-
ant either in the county in which defendant in fact signed the contract,
or in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the com-
mencement of the action. No term or statement contained in an obli-
gation described in this subsection shall constitute a waiver of this pro-
vision.
30. TEx. Rav. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 31 (Supp. 1973).
31. 494 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. 1973).
32. Ch. 213, § 1, [19351 Tex. Laws 503, presently TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1995, subd. 5(a) (Supp. 1973).
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civil appeals,33 the Texas Supreme Court held that "some venue facts may
properly be alleged in the controverting plea without being set up in the
petition. 3 4
Under subdivision 29a of article 1995,35 which governs the venue of a
multiple defendant case, a suit brought against one defendant in a county
where venue is proper as to that defendant may be maintained in such
county as to other defendants provided they are "necessary parties" to
the suit. Reaffirming its earlier delineation of the necessary party re-
quirement,36 the supreme court in Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South
Texas Packers, Inc.37 concluded that the requirement is not satisfied
unless the plaintiff can prove that "no effectual decree could be rendered"
without the joinder of the additional defendants.
Arising under subdivision 23,38 and of particular interest to insurance de-
fense counsel, is -the decision of the supreme court in Employers Casualty
Co. v. Clark. 9 The plaintiffs brought suit against a corporate insurer to
recover under an uninsured motorist provision of a family automobile liability
policy. The insurer filed a plea of privilege, and the plaintiffs responded
with a controverting plea which sought to maintain venue under subdivision
23. Subdivision 23 authorizes suits against a corporation to be brought in
the county 'where the plaintiff resided "at the time the cause of action or
part thereof arose," provided the corporation has an agent or representative
in such county. At the venue hearing it was shown that the accident took
place in the county of suit and that the plaintiffs resided there at the time,
but no evidence was adduced that the motorist causing the accident was "un-
insured" within the meaning of the policy. Consequently, the defendant ar-
gued that there was no showing of the elements necessary to maintenance
of the cause of action. The trial court denied the plea of privilege, and
the court of civil appeals affirmed, stating that it was not necessary for the
plaintiffs to prove a breach of the insurance contract as the statute required
only proof of some element or part of the 'alleged cause of action. Revers-
ing the denial of the plea of privilege, the supreme court concluded that
when the suit is for breach of contract and venue is sought to be maintained
under subdivision 23, it is essential that a plaintiff prove both a contractual
right and a breach thereof.
Subdivision 11 of article 1995,40 which provides that "[i]f the defendant
has inherited an estate concerning which the suit is commenced, suit may
be brought in the county where such estate principally lies," was construed
33. Compare Wilson's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Behrens Drug Co., 481 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1972), with Reader's Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Trahan, 225 S.W.2d
459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949). See also Price v. Murrell R. Tripp & Co.,
268 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954); Elliot Fin. Co. v. Brown, 208 S.W.2d
622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948).
34. 494 S.W.2d at 164.
35. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 29a (1964).
36. E.g., Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158, 293 S.W.2d 758 (1956).
37. 491 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tex. 1973).
38. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 23 (1964).
39. 491 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1973).
40. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 11 (1964).
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for the first time in Deason v. Rogers.41 The plaintiffs, stepdaughters of
the testator, brought suit against the testator's son, seeking to establish their
rights under a certain will executed by the testator. Concluding that the
word "inherited," as used in subdivision 11, should include property "ob-
tained by either devise or descent," the court of civil appeals allowed the
suit to be maintained in the county where the estate was principally
located.42
Subdivision 643 authorizes suit against an executor, administrator or
guardian to establish a money demand with respect to the estate which he
represents to be maintained "in the county in which such estate is admin-
istered." Since an independent executor acts independently of the orders
of the probate court in which the will is probated, the applicability of sub-
division 6 to a suit against an independent executor has been uncertain.
When faced with the question, the Dallas court of civil appeals in Gambill
v. Mathes44 gave a broad interpretation to subdivision 6, holding that an
estate is "administered" by an independent executor in the county where
the will was probated.
Two cases during the survey period concerned the requirement of rule
8645 that a party seeking to oppose a plea of privilege shall file a contro-
verting plea "under oath" within ten days. Testing the strictness of this re-
quirement is the situation considered in Lorenzo Grain Co-Op v. Rangel.46
The plaintiff, intending to contest the defendant's plea of privilege, filed a
controverting plea within the required time, but inadvertently omitted the
verification. At the venue hearing the defendant objected to the omission,
but the trial court permitted an amended controverting plea, identical to the
original except for being verified. Noting a conflict in the decisions on this
point,47 the Amarillo court of civil appeals concluded that the unsworn con-
troverting plea was not fatally defective and that the verification amend-
ment was properly permitted. 49 The second case, Cactus Drilling Corp. v.
Hager,49 concerned a controverting plea which recited that its allegations
were true to the best of the affiant's "'knowledge and belief.' "5 Conced-
ing that this was not the unequivocal verification required by rule 86, the
court nevertheless concluded that the controverting plea was not fatally de-
41. 499 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973), error dismissed w.o.j.
42. Id. at 17.
43. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 6 (1964).
44. 490 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error dismissed; accord, Am-
berson v. F.G. Rodgers & Co., 271 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954),
error dismissed.
45. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.
46. 491 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973).
47. Compare M.C. Winters, Inc. v. Lawless, 407 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1966), error dismissed; Farmer v. Cassity, 252 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1952), and Continental Fire & Cas. Ins. Corp. v. Whitlock, 215 S.W.2d 657
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948), with H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Vaught, 413 S.W.2d
940, 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967), error dismissed, Globe Fin. & Thrift
Co. v. Thompson, 412 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967), and Eastland
v. Whitman, 318 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958).
48. 491 S.W.2d at 704.
49. 487 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972).
50. Id. at 760.
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fective. 51 Moreover, since the deficiency in the controverting plea could
have been cured by amendment, reasoned the court, the plaintiff's failure
to lodge an objection constituted a waiver of the defect.
Thompson v. Thompson52 demonstrates the value of rule 21a 5 in the con-
text of a venue contest. The defendants filed their pleas of privilege on
December 22, and the plaintiff received copies of the pleas the following
day by registered mail. Although rule 8654 requires that a controverting
plea be filed within ten days after the receipt by a party of a copy of the
plea of privilege, the plaintiff did not file her controverting plea until Jan-
uary 5. Concluding that the controverting plea was untimely, the trial court
sustained the pleas of 'privilege. However, rule 21a, which permits service
of documents to be made by registered mail, states that 'whenever a party
is required to do some act within a prescribed period after service upon him
by mail, "three days shall be added to the prescribed period." 55  On the
basis of rule 21a, the court of civil appeals concluded that the plaintiff had
13 days after receipt of the pleas in which to file her controverting plea.
V. PLEADINGS
The most significant case during the survey period dealing with pleading
requirements Was Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roman.56 The
plaintiff brought suit on an automobile insurance policy, alleging generally
that he had complied with all conditions precedent under the policy. Rule
5457 provides that a party who avers the performance of conditions prece-
dent "shall be required to prove only such of them as are specifically denied
by the opposite party." Seeking to invoke rule 54, the defendant alleged
that the "'[p]laintiff has solely [sic] failed to comply with the conditions
of said policy, to 'wit,' " followed by a copy of the entire set of conditions
contained in the policy. 58 One of 'the conditions of the policy required the
plaintiff to give the insurer written notice of any accident covered by the
policy as soon as practical. Despite a request by the insurer, the trial court
refused to submit an issue to the jury inquiring whether written notice was
given as soon as practical. Intending to discourage the use of shotgun plead-
ings, the Texas Supreme Court concluded "that where the plaintiff avers
generally that all conditions precedent have been performed and no attempt
is made to raise an issue of notice except 'by a sham pleading, the defend-
ant is not entitled to a reversal on the ground that the plaintiff failed to
establish that a written notice condition was performed. .. .
Rule 18560 provides that a suit on sworn account "shall be taken as prima
51. Id. at 761. Contra, Globe Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Thompson, 412 S.W.2d 955
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967).
52. 487 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1972).
53. TEx. R. Civ. P. 21a.
54. TEx. R. Civ. P. 86.
55. TEx. R. Cv. P. 21a.
56. 498 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973) (2d case).
57. Tax. R. Civ. P. 54.
58. 498 S.W.2d at 158.
59. Id. at 156.
60. TEx. R. Civ. P. 185.
254 [Vol. 28
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facie evidence thereof, unless the party resisting such claim shall . . . file
a written denial, under oath" stating specifically why the account is not just
and true. The court of civil appeals, in Smith v. West Texas Hospital,
Inc.,61 held that the verified denial requirement of rule 185 is not applicable
to a defendant who was not a party to the transactions underlying the sworn
account.
A petition containing a prayer that the plaintiff be awarded "'such other
and further relief, general and special in law and in equity, including costs
of court, to which Plaintiff shall be entitled'" was held in Combined Insur-
ance Co. of America v. Kennedy62 to authorize the recovery of prejudgment
interest.
VI. LIMITATIONS
Hays v. Hall68 represents another step toward the long-awaited applica-
tion of the "discovery rule" to the running of the statute of limitations in
all professional malpractice cases. Observing that the unsuccessful vasec-
tomy would be difficult to detect without the superior knowledge of a physi-
cian, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded6 4 that the applicable statute
of limitations commences to run on the date of the discovery of the true
facts, or on the date discovery should reasonably have been made.65
Section 2.725 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code66 provides that
"[a]n action for breach of any contract of sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued." In a case of first impres-
sion the court of civil appeals, in Ideal Builders Hardware Co. v. Cross Con-
struction Co.,6 7 held that section 2.725 extends to four years the statute of
limitations applicable to an open account or oral contract for the sale of
goods and materials.6s
VII. PARTIES
Phillips v. Teinert6 9 is a warning that the legal representatives or succes-
sors of a plaintiff who dies after suit is filed and prior :to trial should always
be joined as parties to the suit. Observing that the successors of the plain-
tiff had a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit and that their inter-
ests would necessarily be affected by any judgment rendered, the court of
61. 487 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972).
62. 495 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
63. 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
64. In a similar fact situation the supreme court applied the discovery rule where
the defendant had severed the vagus nerve of the plaintiff during surgery. Nichols v.
Smith, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 57 (1973). Upon rehearing the case, the supreme court
withdrew this opinion, issuing a new opinion which decided the case on another issue.
Nichols v. Smith, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 220 (1974).
65. 488 S.W.2d at 414; see Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967). See
generally Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627 (1973).
66. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (1968).
67. 491 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1972).
68. 491 S.W.2d at 230; see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.725, Comment;
Spies, Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2-Sales Performance and Remedies, 44
TEXAS L. REV. 629, 638-39 (1966); Teofan, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 88, 93 (1969).
69. 493 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973) (2-1 decision).
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civil appeals concluded that they became indispensable parties upon the
death of the plaintiff.70
Setting aside a judgment rendered against the maker in a suit on a note
brought by one of the two payees, the court in Hinojosa v. Love7l held that
the other payee was an indispensable plaintiff whose joinder was essential.
VIII. DISCOVERY
Upon motion showing "good cause," rule 16772 authorizes the discovery
of any insurance agreement under which an insurance company may be li-
able for all or a portion of the recovery sought in the action. Making clear
its intent to encourage settlement, the Texas Supreme Court, in Carroll
Cable Co. v. Miller,78 concluded that "[i]t is sufficient showing of good
cause that an insurance agreement is not available to the moving party and
that the information is needed to determine settlement and litigation strat-
egy."' 74
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co.75
illustrates the proper use of a request for admission of fact under rule 169.76
The plaintiffs submitted a set of requests for admission of fact to the de-
fendants, attaching as an exhibit a transcript of the testimony of a witness
at the earlier trial of a related case. One request asked the defendants to
admit that the transcript was a correct copy of the testimony that the wit-
ness had given at the earlier trial, and another request asked the defend-
ants to admit that the testimony was true. The defendants objected to both
requests, contending that they were outside the scope of rule 169. Subject
to this objection, the defendants stated that they were without sufficient in-
formation to admit or deny the requests. Since the defendants did not com-
ply with that portion of rule 169 which requires a sworn statement setting
forth in detail the reasons why they cannot truthfully either admit or deny
the requests, the trial court granted additional time for the defendants to
file a verified response, and upon failing to do so, the requests were deemed
admitted. Affirming the ruling of the trial court as to the first request, the
supreme court observed that the use of rule 169 extends not only to mat-
ters of fact within the knowledge of a litigant, but to matters readily ascer-
tainable by the litigant of whom the request is made. Thus, reasoned
the court, the defendants "should have ascertained the accuracy of this
transcript from the court reporter if that could have been done with-
out cost or considerable burden," and "[i]f not, they should have filed a
sworn statement setting forth in detail -why they could not truthfully admit
or deny without taking on a costly and unreasonable burden . . . ,,rr In
upholding the defendants' objection to the second request, the supreme court
70. Id. at 585-86.
71. 496 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973).
72. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
73. 501 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1973) (1st case).
74. Id.
75. 490 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1972).
76. TEx. R. Civ. P. 169.
77. 490 S.W.2d at 825.
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held that "[t]he rule does not require a litigant to admit or deny the truth
or falsity of another person's testimony in the trial of another case .... ,,78
After the testimony of a witness giving a deposition is fully transcribed,
rule 20979 requires that the deposition be submitted to the witness for re-
view and signing. If the deposition is not signed due to the "absence of
the witness," however, the rule authorizes the deposition to "be used as -fully
as though signed." Favoring substance over form, the court in Bell v. Line-
han80 concluded that the requirements of rule 209 were met where the fail-
ure of a witness to sign his deposition was due to the death of the witness.
Ramsay v. Santa Rosa Medical Center8l illustrates the risks inherent in
refusing to submit to discovery ordered by a trial court. The plaintiff, who
had previously been committed to a mental institution, brought an action
against the institution and two of its medical personnel, claiming his confine-
ment had been unlawful. After learning that plaintiff's commitment had
been prompted by the reading of a personal diary kept by the plaintiff, the
defendants moved, under rule 167,82 to discover the diary subject to in cam-
era inspection by the trial court to determine which portions were relevant.
The trial court ordered the production of the diary for in camera examina-
tion, but the plaintiff refused. After it was determined that the refusal was
willful, the trial court invoked the sanctions authorized by rule 17083 and
dismissed the plaintiff's suit. Refusing to find an abuse of discretion, the
court of civil appeals concluded that the dismissal was warranted under the
circumstances.
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The intricacy of summary judgment procedure under rule 166-A 84 is re-
flected by the decision in Texas National Corp. v. United Systems Interna-
tional, Inc.85 The plaintiff brought suit on a promissory note executed by
the defendant. The petition, which was not verified, alleged all of the ele-
ments of the plaintiff's action and had attached to it a copy of the note
sued upon. Following the defendant's filing of a general denial, the plain-
tiff moved for summary judgment. While the affidavit which was submitted
in support of the motion stated that the factual allegations contained in the
petition are true and correct, neither the original nor a sworn copy of the
note was attached to the affidavit. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. In
reversing the judgments of the lower courts, the supreme court concluded
the summary judgment proof was deficient in at least two respects.
First, factual statements to support the motion for summary judgment
were in the pleadings, not in a sworn motion or affidavit in support of the
78. Id.
79. TEx. R. Cir. P. 209.
80. 500 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
81. 498 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
82. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167.
83. TEx. R. Civ. P. 170.
84. TEx. R. Crv. P. 166-A.
85. 493 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1973).
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motion. Unless the case is one properly to be decided upon the pleadings,
a motion for summary judgment should be supported by its own proof as
specified in rule 166-A, and not by reference to the pleadings.86 Second,
neither the original nor a sworn copy of the note was attached to the mo-
tion or the affidavit as required by rule 166-A. Supporting proofs should
be attached to the motion or affidavit, not to the pleadings.87  The supreme
court also reiterated the advisability of attaching the original of the note to
the motion or affidavit. While the original of the note carries with it evi-
dence of possession and ownership, a copy does not.88 Thus, if a sworn
or certified copy, rather than the original of the note, is used, the motion
or affidavit must establish that the plaintiff is the present owner and holder
and in possession of the note. 9
X. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
No area of civil procedure underwent more change during the past year
than that of special issue submission. The new amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective September 1, 1973, liter-
ally revolutionized the submission of special issues in Texas.90 The changes
resulting from these -amendments fall into several categories.
First, rule 27791 now makes it discretionary with the trial court whether
to submit separate questions with respect to each element of a case and to
submit issues broadly. Hence, an objection to a special issue on the ground
that it is "multifarious," "global," "too 'broad and general" or "is tantamount
to a general charge" will no longer be recognized.
Second, inferential rebuttal issues are now prohibited. 2 Previously, a
party was entitled to submission of issues relating to facts which, if estab-
lished, would inferentially disprove the existence of some essential element
of the opponent's claim. The elimination of the use of inferential rebuttal
issues will, no doubt, reduce the potential for conflicting jury findings. 93
Under former practice the burden of proof on a special issue was placed
by framing the burden within the issue, through the manner in which the
issue was stated.9 4 If this method complicated the form of the issue, then
86. 493 S.W.2d at 741; accord, Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d
540 (Tex. 1971).
87. 493 S.W.2d at 741; accord, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d
230 (Tex. 1962).
88. 493 S.W.2d at 740; accord, Perkins v. Crittenden, 462 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1970);
Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Larue, 367 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1963); Hensley v. Jones,
492 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973).
89. 493 SW.2d at 741.
90. See Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 36 TEx. B.J. 495 (1973). See generally
McElhaney, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 179, 188
(1970); Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for
Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973); 1 TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES (Supp. 1973).
91. TEx. R. CIv. P. 277.
92. Id.
93. See G. HOoGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS 48 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as HODGES].




the burden of proof could be placed by a separate instruction.95 Completely
eliminating any restriction, the new amendments provide that the placing of
the burden of proof may be accomplished by separate instructions rather
than by inclusion in the question.96
A fourth change concerns the use of explanatory instructions and defini-
tions. Previously, an issue was condemned as being too general or multi-
farious if it inquired about several disputed facts. 97 An issue was subject
to this objection where it included the factual items to be considered by
the jury in the definition or explanation of a general term used in the issue.,,
Eliminating this objection from the arsenal of the trial practitioner, rule
27799 now directs the trial court to submit such explanatory instructions and
definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict and "in
such instances the charge shall not be subject to the objection that it is a
general charge."
A major transformation has also occurred in the submission of negligence
cases. Trial courts are now empowered to submit special issues in a negli-
gence action "in a manner that allows a listing of the claimed acts or omis-
sions of any party to an accident . . . with appropriate spaces for answers
as to each [such] act or omission . ... 100 The trial court is also author-
ized ,to submit a single question inquiring whether a party was negligent,
including with such question a listing of the acts or omissions correspond-
ing to those listed in the preceding question, and containing appropriate
spaces for answers as to each such act or omission. 101 A further question
may inquire whether the acts or omissions, listing them, "were proxi-
mate causes of the accident . . . that is the 'basis of the suit."'01 2 Signifi-
cantly, similar forms of questions may be used in non-negligence cases.103
In a case in which issues are raised concerning the negligence of more
than one party to a suit, rule 277104 requires the trial court to submit an
issue "inquiring -what percentage, if any, of the negligence that caused the
accident is attributable to each of the parties found to have been negligent."
Furthermore, the trial court is required to instruct the jury to answer the
damage issues without any reduction because of any negligence on the part
of the person injured.10 5
The final change concerns comment by the trial court on the weight of
the evidence. Under the former rule, the trial judge was required to frame
95. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277, 2 TEx R. Civ. P. ANN. 640 (1967). See generally
HoDGEs 88-90.
96. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
97. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277, 2 TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. 640 (1967).
98. See HODGES 113.






105. Id.; see TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. 1973). See generally




his charge so as to "not therein comment on the weight of the evidence." 106
This phrase has been deleted. 107 The trial court is now only prohibited from
commenting "directly" on the weight of the evidence.' 08 Thus, the charge
is no longer objectionable because it "incidentally" constitutes a comment
on the weight of the evidence. 109
In addition to the recent amendments to the rules, several developments
in the field of special issue practice have occurred by way of judicial deci-
sion. For example, during the trial in Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc.,110
evidence was adduced that the decline in the plaintiff's business was due
to causes unrelated to certain trade practices of the defendants. The defend-
ants requested special issues inquiring if the business losses of the plaintiff
were the proximate result solely of the plaintiff's own conduct and condi-
tions beyond the control of any party. These issues were refused by the
trial court. Noting that "the issues requested would rebut the damages re-
sulting from the defendants' acts," the Texas Supreme Court, while revers-
ing on other grounds, held that "if the evidence raises these matters on a
new trial, they should be presented to the jury in the form of instructions
accompanying the damage issue rather than in the form of separate special
issues.""' This judicial modification of Texas special issue practice, which
prohibits the use of yet another inferential rebuttal issue, 112 has been made
part of new rule 277,118 although the prohibition in the rule bars submission
of all inferential rebuttal issues. 1 4
Jackson was reversed because the instruction accompanying the damages
issue used the phrase "loss of monetary reward" to describe the loss of net
profits for which the plaintiff sought compensation. Noting that "no other
instruction was given connecting that phrase with net profits or with any
other recognized measure of damages," 'the supreme court concluded that
the submission was fatally defective because "it simply failed to guide the
jury to a finding of any proper legal measure of damages.""'
Rule 27216 stipulates that objections to the charge shall "in every
instance" be presented to the trial court "before the charge is read to the
106. Tex. R. Civ. P. 272, 2 TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. 571 (1967). See generally
HoDGES 19.
107. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 272.
108. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
109. Id.
110. 499 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1973).
111. Id. at 90-91.
112. The use of instructions to place before the jury matters which could be used
in defense against an allegation of negligence has been suggested to be the proper prac-
tice for several other types of inferential defenses. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro,
493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973) (instruction substituted for excuse issue); Adam Dante
Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972) (open and obvious issue and discovered
peril issues); Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1971) (sudden emergency
and unavoidable accident issues replaced by instructions); Moulton v. Alamo Ambu-
lance Serv., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1967) (issues as to mitigation eliminated);
Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359, 250 S.W.2d 379 (1952) (elimina-
tion of new and independent cause).
113. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see notes 92 & 93 supra, and accompanying text.
114. 499 S.W.2d at 90.
115. Id.
116. TEx. R. Civ. P. 272.
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jury . "..  Finding that the purpose of the rule was to enable the trial
court to submit a proper charge to the jury and to have the prior benefit
of counsel's objections so as to correct any errors that might otherwise oc-
cur, the supreme court concluded in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Cross"7
that it was error for a trial court to approve an agreement between counsel
that objections to the charge could be made while the jury was deliberating.
Moreover, when objections are made to the charge after it is read to the
jury, warns the court, the objections will be considered as "waived.""18  The
supreme court also found that rule 286,119 which requires that any supple-
mentary instruction given to the jury after it has retired to deliberate be
made in writing and presented in open court, was violated where the trial
court attempted an oral explanation to the jury in a hallway.
Monsanto Co. v. Milam120 points out the risk in obscuring a valid objec-
tion to the charge 'by voluminous unfounded objections. Contained in the
defendant's 150 objections, which covered forty-two pages of the transcript,
was a stock objection to each special issue on the ground that "''[t]here
are no pleadings to warrant the submission of said issue ... . "-121 On ap-
peal it was conceded that several issues were not supported by the pleadings.
Nevertheless, observing that the stock objections failed to point out distinctly
the grounds therefor and were concealed in a multitude of other objections,
the supreme court concluded that rule 274122 had been violated and for that
reason the objections were properly overruled.
XI. JURY PRACTICE
Although rule 233123 states that "[e]ach party to a civil suit shall be en-
tided to six peremptory challenges in a case tried in the district court," the
fact a person is named as a party to a suit does not in itself entitle him
to six peremptory challenges. 124  "In order for each of two defendants to
be entitled to the six peremptory strikes allowed 'by rule 233," reiterates the
court in Shell Chemical Co. v. Lamb,125 "it must appear from the pleadings
that the interests of those defendants are antagonistic on an issue with which
the jury may be concerned."
An unusual situation was presented in Lopez v. Allee. 126 Two cases were
set for jury trial on the same day. The first case was called and after voir
dire examination, counsel marked their respective jury lists to indicate their
peremptory challenges. Prior to the actual selection of the jury, however,
the first case was settled. The trial court then returned the prospective
117. 501 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. 1973).
118. Id. at 873.
119. TEx. R. CIv. P. 286.
120. 494 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1973).
121. Id. at 536.
122. Tax. R. COv. P. 274.
123. TEx. R. CIv. P. 233. See also TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2151a (Supp.
1973).
124. E.g., Retail Credit Co. v. Hyman, 316 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1958), error ref.
125. 493 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1973).
126. 493 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
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jurors from the first jury list to the panel for the second case. All names
on the second panel were shuffled and redrawn to constitute the jury list
for the second case. Ultimately, eight jurors whose names had been struck
on the jury lists of the first case were placed on the panel for the second
case. From an adverse verdict in the second case, the plaintiff appealed,
contending that former article 2094a127 had been violated. Article 2094a
provided that "[o]nce a prospective juror has been removed from a jury
panel . . . by peremptory challenge . . .he shall be immediately dismissed
from jury service and shall not be placed on another jury panel until his
name is returned to the jury wheel and drawn again as a prospective juror."
In denying the plaintiff's contention, the San Antonio court of civil appeals
stated that "[s]ince no jury had been selected in the first case, it would
necessarily follow that no jurors had been peremptorily challenged on such
panel." 28
Article 2151a 129 provides that "[a]fter proper alignment of parties, it
shall be the duty of the court to equalize the number of peremptory chal-
lenges provided under Rule 233 . . .in accordance with the ends of justice
so that no party is given an unequal advantage because of 'the number of
peremptory challenges allowed that party." In a case of first impression,
the court of civil appeals in Austin Road Co. v. Evans,3 0 concluded that
article 2151a authorized the trial court to give the defendant nine peremp-
tory challenges so as to equalize the six peremptory challenges given to each
of three plaintiffs, who had been found to be antagonistic to each other.' 31
Hemmenway v. Skibo, s2 a case in which the plaintiff sued to recover for
personal injuries sustained in a collision with the defendant's truck, is a study
in jury brinksmanship. After an adverse jury verdict, the defendant, who
was apparently being defended by his insurer, appealed, contending that
various statements made by plaintiff's counsel during the proceeding were
prejudicial. Plaintiff's counsel -had asked the jury panel on voir dire exam-
ination whether any of them worked for an insurance company or investi-
gated any kind of personal injury accidents. 88 Next, during the examina-
tion of his client, plaintiff's counsel inquired whether he had told the defend-
ant's "people" that he had had two beers prior to the accident "'when they
127. Ch. 905, § 14, [1971] Tex. Laws 2801. See also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
2094a (Supp. 1973).
128. 493 S.W.2d at 333.
129. TEx. REv. CV. STAT. ANN. art. 2151a (Supp. 1973). See generally Jones, Per-
emptory Challenge--Should Rule 233 Be Changed?, 45 TExAS L. REV. 80 (1966).
130. 499 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973) (2-1 decision), error ref.
n.r.e.
131. In Evans the plaintiffs were motorists traveling single file down a road where
visibility was obscured by a combination of dust from lime spread during road construc-
tion by the defendants and the weather. In actuality, the three plaintiffs sued each
other and the defendant, and the defendant counter-claimed against the third plaintiff,
who was last in the line of three cars. The third plaintiff was found to have been
negligent and appealed, assigning as error that the defendant received nine peremptory
challenges while each plaintiff received only six. The formula used by the trial court
to apportion the challenges was not stated.
132. 498 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
133. Id. at 11-12. See generally Figari, supra note 5, at 193.
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came and took a sworn statement from you the next day.' 1834 Later, dur-
ing his opening argument to the jury, plaintiff's counsel stated that he had
produced all of the evidence, and "'[w]hen it became time for the defend-
ants to put on the evidence, they rested.' "185 Plaintiff's counsel continued,
stating that "'one other time I remember the defendant didn't put on any
evidence in a case was in the Gus Mutscher trial. When the State put on
their evidence-.' "136 Finally, during his closing argument, plaintiff's coun-
sel stated, "'I don't want a judgment against this defendant over here and
I am asking you, Ladies and Gentlemen, to answer this issue right here...
[i.e., the damage issue], . . . Ten Thousand Dollars .... ' "117 Conclud-
ing that the cumulative effect of the remarks of plaintiff's counsel constituted
reversible error, the court of civil appeals remanded the case for a new trial.
XII. JUDGMENT
It is well settled in Texas that a nunc pro tunc order may be entered
at any time by the trial court to correct a "clerical error" in an earlier judg-
ment.18  Since "judicial error" in a judgment is not subject to correction
after the expiration of thirty days from its entry, the Texas courts are fre-
quently called upon to distinguish between the two.1s9 Dikeman v. Snell' 40
is one such instance. The plaintiff brought suit to remove restrictions
against the use of his property for commercial purposes. After a jury ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court entered a judgment permitting
commercial use of the property provided the plaintiff built a brick fence to
separate it from the rest of the subdivision. After the judgment became
final, the plaintiff filed a motion to correct it, claiming that provision for
a brick fence had been included in the judgment as a result of a clerical
error. Sustaining the motion, -the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc judg-
ment, this time conditioning the commercial use of the property on the con-
struction of a wooden fence. Observing that the nunc pro tunc judgment
purported to rewrite the decretal portion of the original judgment, the su-
preme court concluded that it was a nullity because "[i]f inclusion of the
original proviso concerning the fence . . . was a mistake, it was a judicial
and not a clerical mistake."' 4'
134. 498 S.W.2d at 12.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id.
The court of civil appeals took judicial notice of the facts behind this reference
which alluded "to the criminal trial of the former Speaker of the Texas House of Rep-
resentatives who did not take the stand in his own defense or offer affirmative testi-
mony upon the trial." The Mutscher trial, which resulted in a verdict of guilty, had
been widely publicized throughout Texas. Id. at 13 n.5.
137. Id. at 13.
138. See generally 4 R. McDONALD, TExAs CIVIL PRACrICE § 17.08.1 (Elliott rev.
1971); Reavley & Orr, Trial Court's Power To Amend Its Judgments, 25 BAYLOR L.
REV. 191 (1973).
139. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 471 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.
1971); Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1968); Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291,
257 S.W.2d 289 (1953); Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29, 285 S.W. 1079 (1926) (2d
case); Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).
140. 490 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1973).
141. Id. at 186.
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XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
A curious situation involving the grant of a motion for new trial was pre-
sented in Travelers Express Co. v. Winters.1 42 Six days after the rendition
of judgment against her, the defendant filed a motion for new trial. The
trial court orally granted the motion eight days after its filing, but no written
order was ever entered. Finally, on the eighty-eighth day after the filing
of the motion the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc judgment granting to
the defendant a new trial. Overruling the plaintiff's contention that rule
329b 148 divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a judgment granting
a new trial at such a late date, the appellate court concluded that "[t]he
oral order of the court granting the new trial was valid and the entry of
the order was only a ministerial act.' 144
It has not always been clear whether a defendant seeking to set aside
a default judgment through the timely filing of a motion for new trial must
exonerate himself from all negligence in failing to answer.' 45 The El Paso
court of civil appeals has concluded "that where an appeal from a default
judgment is by motion for new trial the issue is not based upon negligence




Upon a showing of "good cause," rule 386147 authorizes the court of civil
appeals to extend the time for filing the transcript and statement of facts.
Embry v. Bel-Aire Corp., 48 a recent decision by the Supreme Court of
Texas, reiterates the liberal construction to be given rule 386. The
appellant filed a motion for extension of time in which to file the statement
of facts and transcript, showing that the court reporter had moved out of
state and would be unable to prepare the statement of facts within -the pre-
scribed period. The motion was granted by the court of civil appeals, and
the statement of facts and transcript were filed within the extended time.
Later, however, the court set aside its order of extension and dismissed the
appeal for want of jurisdiction, because the appellant had not requested a
transcript from the clerk until four days after he had filed his motion for
extension of time. Reinstating the appeal, the supreme court declared that
a timely motion which asserts as grounds for late filing the fact that the
statement of facts for good cause is not ready, is also sufficient reason for
the late filing of the transcript, irrespective of when the request for the trans-
cript is made to the clerk.
142. 488 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
143. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b.
144. 488 S.W.2d at 892.
145. Compare Young v. Snowcon, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1971), with City of San Antonio v. Garcia, 243 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1951), error ref.
146. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Carter, 499 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1973).
147. Tax. R. Civ. P. 386.
148. 502 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1973).
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A case which caused the supreme court to see double is Anderson v.
Casebolt.'149 After judgment was entered and had become final, the trial
court attempted to set it aside and render the same judgment a second time.
Noting that the two judgments were identical except for the date of entry,
the supreme court held that "the second judgment could serve no purpose
other than to enlarge the time for appeal."'150 Consequently, the time for
appeal was deemed to have commenced running from the entry of the first
judgment.
XV. RES JUDICATA
The most significant development concerning the doctrine of res judicata
is the supreme court's decision in Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America. 51' The
plaintiff contractor sued the defendant to recover the balance claimed to be
owed under a construction contract. The defendant responded that the con-
tractor had not performed in accordance with the contract and asserted a
cross-action to recover for the contractor's breach of the contract. After a
trial on the merits, a judgment was entered that the plaintiff and defendant
take nothing by their respective claims. Later, after the judgment became
final, the plaintiff filed a second suit against the defendant, this time to re-
cover in quantum meruit for the value of labor and materials furnished un-
der the contract. The trial court sustained the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the judgment in the first suit was res
judicata of the quantum meruit claim, and the court of civil appeals
affirmed. Resolving a conflict in the Texas cases, 152 the supreme court held
"that a judgment for the defendant in a suit for breach of contract on the
ground that he is not liable for breach of contract does not preclude a sub-
sequent suit in quantum meruit, the causes of action being regarded as dif-
ferent for res judicata purposes.' 58
Griffin is also significant for its consideration of the effect of the failure
of a party to assert a compulsory counterclaim. Rule 97154 requires that
a pleading "shall state as a counterclaim" any claim within the jurisdiction
of -the court which the pleader has against any opposing party "if it arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the oppos-
ing party's claim." Observing that the claim in quantum meruit arose out
of the transaction that was the subject matter of the cross-action in the first
suit, the supreme court concluded that the claim in quantum meruit "was
a compulsory counterclaim to the cross-action under the provisions of Rule
97" and "[t]he judgment in the first suit is conclusive of the claim for that
reason. .... "I"
149. 493 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1973).
150. Id. at 510.
151. 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1973).
152. Compare Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America, 480 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1972), error granted, with Whitney v. Parish of Vernon, 154 S.W. 264 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1913), error ref., and Henrietta Nat'l Bank v. Barrett, 25 S.W.
456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), error ref.
153. 496 S.W.2d at 538; see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 65, comment j (1942).
154. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97.




Maxey v. Citizens National Bank156 concerned a bizarre series of proce-
dural events. The plaintiffs brought suit against a bank, two of its related
companies, and several of its representatives, claiming fraudulent conversion.
Due to the granting of motions for summary judgment and motions for in-
structed verdict, only the claims against the bank were ultimately submitted
to the jury. Based on the findings of the jury, judgment was entered against
the bank for approximately $2,500,000. The bank subsequently perfected
an appeal and was successful in obtaining a new trial. 1 7 On remand, the
bank filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the earlier sum-
mary judgments and instructed verdict judgments in favor of the other de-
fendants, which were neither severed nor appealed, operated to bar or estop
the plaintiffs from proceeding further against the bank. The trial court
granted the bank's motion for summary judgment and an appeal followed.
Affirming the action of the trial court, the court of civil appeals concluded
that "[a]s plaintiffs' pleadings were drafted, the culpability of the bank, if
any, depended solely on whether the actions of its representatives were tort-
ious," and "[w]hether they were culpable in fact has been foreclosed by
the judgments of absolution plaintiffs permitted to become final."' 58
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Acme Color Art Printing Co. v. Brown'59 the court of civil appeals
reviewed the capacity of a corporation to file suit at a time when its char-
ter was forfeited under article 12.17 of the tax code'6 0 for failure to pay
franchise taxes. Asserting the lack of capacity on the part of the corporate
plaintiff, the defendant filed a plea in abatement, attaching a certificate of
the secretary of state showing that plaintiff's corporate charter had been for-
feited a year earlier. At a hearing on the plea, however, the plaintiff estab-
lished that its franchise taxes had been paid and its charter reinstated a few
days before the hearing. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed
the suit. Noting that "[t]he sole purpose of the statute is to raise revenue,
and that purpose is best served by encouraging a delinquent corporation to
obtain revival of its privileges and access to the courts by paying the amount
due the state," the Dallas court of civil appeals concluded "that a corpora-
tion may maintain a suit commenced when its corporate powers were sus-
pended if its powers are reinstated before the suit is dismissed . . .. o6
In Pearson Grain Co. v. Plains Trucking Co., 62 a case of first impres-
sion, the defendant was served with a writ of garnishment 'after it had issued
156. 489 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), error granted.
157. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Maxey, 461 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1970), error ref. n.r.e.
158. 489 S.W.2d at 705. [Editor's Note: The Texas Supreme Court subsequently
reversed the trial court and court of civil appeals, and remanded the case for a new
trial. 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 244 (1974). The court held that the bank's liability rested
on it's contractual liability as chattel mortgagee and, thus, was not derivative of the
acts of its employees. The finality of the judgments in favor of the employees was,
therefore, not properly a basis for res judicata or collateral estoppel.]
159. 488 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
160. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.17 (1969).
161. 488 S.W.2d at 508.
162. 494 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
[Vol. 28
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
a check in payment of a note made by the garnishor's judgment debtor in
favor of a fourth party. Service was made before the payment of the check
by the drawee bank. The garnishor sued to recover the full amount of the
garnishee's debt to the judgment debtor even though the garnishee purported
to have discharged such debt by the check. The garnishor argued that the
check was not an assignment of funds until it was processed and that the
service of the writ had taken place after the issuance, but before the pres-
entation of the check, and that, therefore, the garnishee had a duty to stop
payment of the check. By allowing the check to be paid, the garnishor ar-
gued, the garnishee remained liable on the debt for purposes of garnishment.
Noting that no request was made to the garnishee to stop payment, the court
of civil appeals held that the garnishor could enforce against the garnishee
only those debts the judgment debtor himself could enforce. Here, by mu-
tual agreement between the garnishee and the judgment debtor, the issuing
and mailing of the check had discharged the debtor's rights against the gar-
nishee.
A plaintiff seeking a non-suit after his opponent has incurred discovery
expenses should take note of Harris v. Shotwell.163 The trial court permit-
ted the plaintiffs to non-suit their action without taxing against them certain
deposition costs incurred by the defendant. Finding an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, the court of civil appeals construed rule 131,164
which states that "[t]he successful party to a suit shall recover of his ad-
versary all costs incurred therein," to require the taxation of the deposition
costs against the plaintiffs.
Article 2226,165 which authorizes the recovery of a reasonable attorney's
fee in specified cases, has been held not to require that the claim be pre-
sented thirty days prior to the filing of suit.166 The demand may be made
after suit is filed; however, the filing of suit is not of itself a presentment
of the claim within the terms of the statute. 6 7
163. 490 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
164. TEx. R. Civ. P. 131.
165. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1973).
166. El Paso Moulding & Mfg. Co. v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 331
(Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
167. Id.
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